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 Abstract 
 Although the many diﬃ  culties of Tunisia’s democratic transition have received signiﬁ cant 
 attention over the past six months, there has been relatively little commentary regarding the 
claims and attitudes that made the winter mobilizations so unique. Th e movement’s so-called 
lack of leadership, the proliferation of parties, the economic and ﬁ nancial crisis, the risk of 
a supposedly Islamist threat—all these themes have been discussed at length by analysts in 
Tunisia and abroad. Consequently, rather than engaging in yet another attempt to assess the 
movement’s success, or predict its failure, this paper examines an aspect of the mobilization that 
has attracted surprisingly little attention, namely, the Tunisian protestors’ call for dignity 
( karama ) and respect ( ihtiram ). 
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 “What we need to do is to kill ourselves”. 1 
Although the many diﬃ  culties of Tunisia’s democratic transition have received 
signiﬁ cant attention over the past six months, there has been relatively little 
commentary regarding the claims and attitudes that made the winter mobili-
zations so unique. Th e movement’s so-called lack of leadership, the prolifera-
tion of parties, the economic and ﬁ nancial crisis, the risk of a supposedly 
Islamist threat—all these themes have been discussed at length by analysts in 
Tunisia and abroad. Consequently, rather than engaging in yet another 
attempt to assess the movement’s success, or predict its failure, this paper 
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examines an aspect of the mobilization that has attracted surprisingly little 
attention, namely, the Tunisian protestors’ call for dignity ( karama ) and 
respect ( ihtiram ). 
 What speciﬁ c claims, and what type of relation to past national narratives 
and the broader society, does this call express? Th e Tunisian uprisings repre-
sent the end of two main narratives that had informed oﬃ  cial discourse and 
helped governments to maintain a close grip over society since the country’s 
independence in 1956. Joseph Maila has identiﬁ ed these two narratives as 
the myth of nationalist “restitution”, and the myth of economic “retribution”. 
According to the former, the state would grant people symbolic revenge over 
the colonial period and restore national pride in exchange for society’s compli-
ance with authoritarianism. According to the latter, the state would grant 
people economic security in exchange for society’s obedience. 2 Yet, in contrast 
to these former postcolonial projects of restitution and retribution, the 
demands of Tunisian protesters were essentially about recognition. Th ough 
this article does not claim that dignity is the  only relevant lens through which 
one should consider the Tunisian uprisings, it assumes that looking at the 
recent events in Tunisia from the perspective of democratic transition theory 
alone too hastily imprisons an analysis in an evaluative type of examination, 
and prevents it from grasping an essential aspect of what made the current 
debates about democratization possible. 
 Th e revolution did not have a “zaim”, but it had an icon. On December 17, 
2010, Mohammed Bouazizi—a street vegetable seller—self-immolated after a 
policewoman conﬁ scated his merchandise, his scale, and allegedly slapped 
him in the face. On that same day, the victim’s family and a few union activists 
marched to the prefecture to express their outrage. Many young people who 
identiﬁ ed with Bouazizi engaged in a conﬂ ict with local police. Riots immedi-
ately spread to the neighbouring towns of Menzel Bouziane, Maknas, Argab, 
and Bin Aoun. A few days later, Houcine Nejji—a twenty-six-year-old unem-
ployed man—threw himself from the top of an electric pylon. Th e succession 
of these two suicides, alongside the quick spread of protests in excluded towns 
of the Tunisian south, the violent response of the police (with the deadly 
shooting of two protesters in Menzel Bouziane on December 24), and the very 
late and out of tone declaration of Ben Ali on December 28, simply enhanced 
 2) Joseph Maïla, “Le Moyen Orient dans la tourmente,” in  Les Faces Cachées de la Mondialisation , 
ed. Th ierry de Montbrial and Philippe Moreau Defarges (Paris: IFRI, 2005), 79-95. 
150 N. Marzouki / Middle East Law and Governance 3 (2011) 148–158 
the collective sentiment of outrage at local authorities, the police and the 
national government. 3 
 If the two suicides that served as catalysts for the Tunisian uprisings repre-
sent a foundational element of Tunisian post revolution politics, it is because 
they seem to unsettle most of the key paradigms through which the very 
possibility of social and political change has traditionally been conceived in 
the North African context. First, the two suicides have nothing to do with 
jihadist-type suicide attacks: the violence was uniquely oriented toward the 
self, no collateral victim was harmed, and no revengeful reference to Islam was 
uttered by the two men when they killed themselves. Second, the feeling of 
outrage and oﬀ ence that precipitated the suicides was not primarily about kin-
ship or family honour, but rather about a lost capacity to function as a human 
being. Even though the regional disparity soon appeared as a key challenge to 
the reconstruction of a democratic country following the Tunisian revolution, 
Bouazizi did not kill himself in order to avenge the honour of his family, tribe, 
or town. Instead, his actions arose as a consequence of his being deprived of 
the very capacity to maintain basic necessities of life (i.e., to work, receive an 
education, start a family, and attend to such basic needs as health and secu-
rity). Th ird, the protests that immediately followed Bouazizi’s death were not 
exclusively framed in terms of economic demands. Contrary to the bread riots 
of the 1980s, Sidi Bouzid’s protests appeared from the outset as being oriented 
at once towards the call for civil rights as well as economic redistribution. 
Fourth, during the demonstrations that took place until February 2011, very 
few references to postcolonial or panarabist-type reasoning were made. Despite 
the deplorable attitude of the French government throughout the crisis, the 
position of France and Europe was simply ignored by Tunisian protesters. 
Finally, ﬁ fth, references or marks of identiﬁ cation and solidarity with Pales-
tinians were also strikingly absent from protesters’ slogans and posters. 
 Th e speciﬁ c character of the Tunisian protests therefore stems from the fact 
that they took place beyond the narratives of jihadism, tribalism, hunger jac-
querie, postcolonialism, and pro-Palestinian mobilization. Rather, they were 
oriented towards a politics of recognition, that is, the inseparable recognition 
of civil rights and economic redistribution. Here, the notion of dignity points 
to the emergence of a form of universal humanism that emerged from the 
 3) International Crisis Group, “Soulèvements populaires en Afrique du Nord et au 
Moyen-Orient (IV): La voie tunisienne,”  Middle East/North Africa Report n°106 , 28 April 2011, 
 http://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/regions/moyen-orient-afrique-du-nord/afrique-du-nord/
Tunisia/106-popular-protests-in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-iv-tunisias-way.aspx 
(accessed 6 July 2011), 3-5. 
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bottom-up—independently from academic discussions about the religious-
secular divide, and apart from the top-down activism of human rights 
organizations. 
 Th e meaning in Bouazizi’s self-immolatio 
 Rather than trying to determine why exactly the Tunisian revolution started 
on December 17, 2010, it may prove more productive to explain what made 
Bouazizi’s act so meaningful to most Tunisians that it ended up being the cata-
lyst for the revolution. 
 Th e Fallacy of Democratic Language 
 As surprising or extreme as it may have seemed, Bouazizi’s desperate act 
stemmed from the desperate state of Tunisian society—a context in which the 
political vocabulary of democracy and human rights had progressively lost all 
meaning and capacity to persuade the Tunisian public. Although the (ironic) 
appropriation and hijacking of democratic terminology by Ben Ali’s regime is 
indeed not a direct cause of Bouazizi’s self-immolation, it does partly explain 
why his suicide had such an impact on Tunisian minds, and subsequently trig-
gered such an unforeseen mobilization. As freedom of association and free-
dom of speech had been progressively annihilated, Tunisians had gotten used 
to simply ignoring the government’s tightly censored press, 4 notably the infa-
mous oﬃ  cial daily newspaper, La Presse, which most people used as pottery or 
food wrapping rather than as source of information. In this newspaper, just as 
in television news programs or in magazines, surrealistic ﬂ atteries of the for-
mer president’s commitment to democracy were proclaimed ad nauseam. For 
example, on May 3, 2010, a dispatch of the Agence Tunis Afrique Presse 
(TAP) described in the following terms how Tunisian journalists were cele-
brating the day of freedom of the press:
 Tunisian journalists celebrate this day, in their commitment to accomplishing their role 
in consecrating the features of a society that is modernist, open, and founded on princi-
ples of liberty, democracy, dialogue, pluralism and acceptance of contrary opinion. Th is 
determination is made stronger by the political will of the President who continu-
ously grants the information and communication sector a special attention and a constant 
 4) See, for example, Human Rights Watch, “Tunisia, Worsening Repression of Human Rights 
Defenders, Journalists,” 21 January 2010,  http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/01/20/tunisia
-worsening-repression-human-rights-defenders-journalists (accessed 6 July 2011). 
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support, and who tirelessly works towards consolidating the role of this sector to impulse 
a pluralist democratic, through the consecration of a free information, that is pluralist 
and objective and that answers to expectations and interests of citizens, and that interacts 
with their concerns and ambitions, based on the idea that responsibility is the corollary 
of liberty. 5 
 Long before the revolution, Tunisian blogger “Astrubal” had written a striking 
analysis of the vocabulary used in newspapers such as La Presse, and shown 
how words like “people”, “change”, “ambition”, and “democracy” were repeat-
edly used. 6 Examining a sample of La Presse’s articles, the blogger demon-
strated how sentences were built upon series of empty propositions that could 
be used interchangeably. For example, introductions such as “in the frame-
work of the civilisational challenge” and “in the wake of our renown reform-
ers” could be randomly followed by propositions such as “the importance of 
the humanitarian aspect of the thinking of our Head of state embodies the 
exemplary illustration of Tunisia success and shows” or “the immensity of the 
successes achieved by the country in all domains expresses the steady presiden-
tial will to consolidate”, and concluded, indiﬀ erently, by statements such as 
“the smart mechanisms of a societal commitment that calls for the admiration 
of all” or “this wisdom characteristic of the Tunisian people, that same genius 
that engendered Hannibal, Ibn Khaldoun, Bourguiba and Ben Ali [sic]”. 
Several organizations endorsed such empty and ﬂ owery statements, most 
notably women’s rights associations and NGO’s, which French political scien-
tist Beatrice Hibou more appropriately described as “RGOs” (“really govern-
mental organizations”). 7 Th e primary task of these various human rights 
organizations was to celebrate the feminist accomplishment of the president’s 
spouse, the president’s democratic beliefs, and feed the “Islamist threat” myth 
in order to justify repression against all possible political opponents. 
 5) “Une information libre et responsable au service d’une société modernist, démocratique 
et pluralist,”  Agence Tunis Afrique Presse, 2 May 2010,  http://actualites.marweb.com/tunisie/
medias/une-information-libre-et-responsable-au-service-une-societe.html (accessed 6 July 
2011). For an analysis of the pro-democracy language of government-monitored media under 
the Ben Ali regime, see Myriam Marzouki, “Parler la dictature de Ben Ali,”  Le Monde , 23 January 
2011,  http://lmsi.net/Parler-la-dictature (accessed 6 July 2011). 
 6) Astrubal, “L’art tunisien de la langue de bois [logiciel],”  Astrubal’s Blog , 20 April 2004,  http://
astrubal.nawaat.org/2004/04/20/l%E2%80%99art-tunisien-de-la-langue-de-bois-logiciel/ 
(accessed 6 July 2011). 
 7) Béatrice Hibou,  La force de l’obéissance: économie politique de la répression en Tunisie (Paris: 
La Découverte, 2006). 
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 In a context where Tunisians had been denied the possibility to develop 
their own political vocabulary, and where the language of democracy and 
human rights had lost all meaning, it is unsurprising that Bouazizi’s silent 
renunciation of life, rather than lengthy political discourse, became the foun-
dational moment of the Tunisian revolution. Denying the charade of democ-
racy propagated by Ben Ali’s media, Bouazizi’s death opened up the possibility 
for Tunisians to rediscover a capacity to utter meaningful words. 
 Th e Pietization of Society 
 While the vocabulary of democracy and human rights had been transformed 
into such an artiﬁ cial and derisory set of references, and while repression 
and fear had become an integral part of people’s daily routine, the moraliza-
tion of bodily behaviour had become one of the only available practices 
through which individuals could maintain and express some form of agency. 
Despite Ben Ali’s policy of crushing Islamist opposition, and the subsequent 
exile of most Nahda leadership, Tunisian society had turned increasingly pious 
since the 1990s. Beyond the development of public piety, 8 the spread of reli-
gious attire, and the increase of mosque attendance, this pietization was also 
based on the moralization of everyday experience, in which discussions about 
the distinction between what is pure and impure, and what is acceptable or 
inappropriate gained a major role. Both an instrument and an expression of 
this moralization process, the individual body became the central element 
of piety. 
 To a large extent, the situation that prevailed in Tunisia before the revolu-
tion is very similar to the one described by anthropologist Johan Rasanayagan 
in the post-Soviet Uzbekistan of President Karimov. 9 In his analysis of “how 
individuals fashion themselves as Muslim when the government attempts to 
maintain tight control over religious expression, routinely employing the coer-
cive resources of the state to this end,” Rasanayagam argues that, in a context 
where free and public debate has become stiﬂ ed, “lived experience become[s] 
a privileged site for moral reasoning.” 10 Similarly, in Ben Ali’s Tunisia—a 
context where space for public debate and collective contest was reduced to 
  8) Lara Deeb,  An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi’I Lebanon (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2006). 
  9) Johan Rasanayagam,  Islam in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan: Th e Morality of Experience (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
 10) Ibid., 2. 
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nothing—the moralization of bodily behaviour became an essential practice 
whereby individuals could recover some sense of dignity. From this point of 
view, the corporal rather than verbal dimension of Bouazizi’s self-immolation 
may be understood as an extension of the broader pietization of Tunisian 
society. 
 A Politics of Justice 
 Th e Versatility and Critique of Bouazizi’s Myth 
 Th e question remains of how exactly this act gave way to a massive  mobilization 
that ultimately led to the downfall of Ben Ali. Ample commentary has emerged 
regarding structural reasons such as unemployment, corruption, lack of redis-
tribution due to the predatory practice of the reigning family, and inequality 
of development among regions. 11 However, it is herein worth examining the 
way in which the Bouazizi myth was so readily constructed and challenged. In 
December 2010, the vegetable seller was swiftly transformed into the icon of 
the revolution, whereas Fayda Hamdi, the policewoman who had allegedly 
slapped him in the face before conﬁ scating his merchandise and scale, was 
unanimously condemned as a symbol of the arbitrariness and cruelty of Ben 
Ali’s regime. Yet ﬁ ve months later, Bouazizi’s status as a revolutionary idol has 
been seriously challenged, while Fayda Hamdi—having been released from 
jail following ﬁ ve months’ imprisonment (during which she underwent a one-
month hunger strike in order to gain the right to a fair trial)—is perceived by 
many to be as much of a victim of Ben Ali’s regime as Bouazizi himself. After 
praising the Bouazizi family members as heroes and martyrs, many Tunisians 
now criticize them as too greedy and arrogant. Th eir modest apartment in La 
Marsa, a chic suburb of Tunis, is now sometimes emphatically described as a 
fancy palace, and some even go so far as to compare Bouazizi’s greedy and 
vocal mother to the former president’s wife, Leila Ben Ali. 
 Having closely investigated the exact unfolding of events in Sidi Bouzid 
since December 2010, French journalist Christophe Ayad has revealed that 
Lamine Al-Bouazizi, a union activist of the Union Générale des Travailleurs 
Tunisiens [UGGT], and Fawzi Hamdi, a schoolteacher, member of the 
UGTT’s local branch, and Fayda Hamdi’s own brother, fabricated the story of 
 11) International Crisis Group, “Soulèvements populaires,” 21-25. 
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the slap in the face. 12 Many activists of UGTT, Lamine Al-Bouazizi explained 
to Ayad, had understood that “the regime was vulnerable” since the Gafsa 
strikes in 2008, and were waiting for any opportunity to protest against the 
regime. He admits that right after Bouazizi’s self-immolation, he and his fel-
low activists presented the street vendor as a unemployed graduate, while the 
only diploma he actually had was a baccalaureate. Moreover, the union activ-
ists spread the rumour of the policewoman slapping the fruit seller in the face. 
“In order to mobilize those who are not educated, we invented the story of the 
slap in the face from Fayda Hamdi. Here, it’s a rural and traditional area, it 
oﬀ ends people.” A few months later, Lamine Al-Bouazizi and Fawzi Hamdi 
themselves joined the mobilization for Fayda Hamdi’s liberation: “we were 
protesting against Ben Ali, not against Fayda.” 
 Ayad’s investigation into the Bouazizi myth’s fabrication points at two 
essential elements, which illustrate the uniqueness of the Tunisian move-
ments. First, it shows that the mobilizations did not emerge completely out of 
the blue, as purely spontaneous and apolitical expressions of disgust and exas-
peration. Th ough the self-immolation resonated with the suﬀ ering of most 
Tunisians in Sidi Bouzid and beyond, as well as triggered a real sense of collec-
tive outrage, the demonstrations that followed Bouazizi’s death were partly 
channelled and directed by local UGTT activists, who had been waiting for 
such an opportunity since well before 2010. Th e argument here is not that the 
revolution was entirely orchestrated by the local UGTT chapter. However, 
despite analyses that depict the revolution as deprived of any leadership and 
merely emotional, the story behind the Bouazizi myth shows that the mobili-
zations resulted from the combination of an authentic sense of collective out-
rage and the leadership of some local union activists. 
 Second, the public’s relatively quick dismissal of Bouazizi’s martyrdom, and 
the attendant desire shown by many (even in Sidi Bouzid) to reintegrate the 
policewoman into her community reveal a striking diﬀ erence from the way in 
which supporters of jihadist attacks revere their martyrs. Th e shifting statuses 
of the vegetable seller and the policewoman as martyrs suggest at once a form 
of democratization of the status of martyr, and most importantly, a striking 
political lucidity among many Tunisians. Having sacriﬁ ced one’s life no longer 
seems to aﬀ ord the deceased a right to wholehearted, unquestioned venera-
tion, as in the case of jihadist martyrdom. Even though many Tunisians still 
 12) Christophe Ayad, “La révolution de la Giﬂ e,”  Libération , 11 June 2011,  http://www
.liberation.fr/monde/01012342664-la-revolution-de-la-giﬂ e (accessed 6 July 2011). 
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mourn and admire Bouazizi, his act, his identity, and his true motives are 
discussed and commented upon as if self-sacriﬁ ce no longer grants martyrs 
immunity from critical thinking. Moreover, a large part of the Tunisian public 
has forgiven Bouazizi’s very “torturer”. Rather than an irrational and indis-
criminate thirst for revenge or victimization, this attitude reveals a capacity 
from Sidi Bouzid’s inhabitants to set up political priorities, and distinguish 
between the people who were actively promoting Ben Ali’s system of repres-
sion, on the one hand, and those who were essentially struggling to survive in 
this system (including members of the police force), on the other. It suggests 
that the protesters are ultimately interested in a politics of recognition and 
justice, rather than one of revenge or pity. 
 Images of Bouazizi that have circulated since December 17 are also very 
instructive in terms of the particular way in which suﬀ ering is depicted, and 
the claims that this representation entails. Th e diﬀ erence between Bouazizi’s 
representation and the aesthetics of jihadist martyrdom is striking. Very few 
photos or drawings of the vendor’s burnt body have been published. Instead, 
the image that became the symbol of the revolution is the portrait of his smil-
ing face, looking aside, raising his hands, in an almost Christ-like pose. 
Furthermore, the representational ﬁ gure of Tunisian protesters is a young, 
skinny male, wearing jeans, t-shirt and tennis shoes. He is very similar to the 
image of young people who have been protesting in Greece and Spain since 
the spring, which completely departs from the jihadist aesthetics of blood 
covered bodies, bombs, and turbans. 13 
 Th e Call for Recognition and Karama 
 Th e entanglement of collective outrage and political claims became apparent 
in the fact that “ karama ” quickly became the rallying cry of Tunisian protes-
tors across classes, professions, and generations. Contrary to what many ana-
lysts tried to show at the beginning of the movements, demonstrators asked 
for much more than bread, and insisted on having the true nature of their 
protest understood by the international public. When shouting “ Khobs wa 
ma, ben ali la ” (“better just bread and water than Ben Ali”), or when raising 
loaves of bread during demonstrations, protesters were deliberately playing 
with traditional signiﬁ ers of Tunisian social movements. Th ey were showing 
 13) French-Algerian artist, Bilal, has represented these ﬁ gures very well in his work. See  http://
www.zoo-project.com/1/ (accessed day month year). BILAL, “Les Martyrs”, April 3, 2011. 
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an astonishing awareness of the demeaning ways in which their government 
and the international community perceived them—namely, as bread and 
couscous eaters. In this context, it is very signiﬁ cant that the word that became 
the motto of all protesters was one that encompasses notions of political and 
civil rights, as well as that of social-economic capacity. In calling for dignity, 
Tunisians were not merely asking for the lowering of food prices, but for an 
end to corruption as a mode of government. Interestingly, the word that spon-
taneously emerged as the rallying cry of protesters was  karama and respect 
( ihtiram ), not honor ( charaf, namous ). Th e collective demand was oriented 
towards a form of universal humanism that is not determined by any cultural 
or religious particularism. Th e reality that Tunisian protesters wanted to be 
recognized is not primarily about Arab, Islamic, or tribal identity, but rather 
about a capacity to live and function as human beings. 
 Th e demand for recognition expresses a form of humanism that is com-
pletely disconnected from the fallacious human right discourse of Tunisian 
RGOs. Il also articulates a form of universalism that developed out of the 
encounter between pious behaviour and social activism of UGTT local lead-
ers. Th e form of universal humanism that underlies the demands of Tunisian 
protesters is indeed still in the making. Carrying within itself new categories 
of action and representation, the Tunisian movement asks for new categories 
of analysis. To the extent that its universal humanist call for recognition and 
dignity emerged from a break with fallacious top-down imitation of demo-
cratic language under Ben Ali’s regime, it evokes what Judith Butler describes 
as a “performative contradiction”—namely, a phenomenon “that takes place 
when one with no authorization to speak within and as the universal neverthe-
less lays claim to the term”. Th is “anticipated universality, for which we have 
no ready concept, is one whose articulation will only follow from a contesta-
tion of universality at its already imagined borders.” 14 
 Conclusion 
 Six months after the self-immolation of Bouazizi, the list of challenges and 
diﬃ  culties that Tunisians need to address is continuously growing. Th e pre-
carious security situation, the dramatic economic and employment crisis, the 
 14) Judith Butler,  Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York: Routledge, 
1997), 91. 
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substantial disappointment and conﬁ dence crisis caused by the postponement 
of the elections of the Constitutional Assembly, the conﬂ ict between and 
within the organizations in charge of preparing elections, Ben Ali’s mockery of 
a trial that took place in June in the absence of the former president, the 
increased polarization in public debate between Islamists and secularists—all 
these developments indicate that the democratization process is, to this day, 
extremely fragile. But no matter what comes out of the upcoming months, a 
dramatic semantic, symbolic and aesthetic shift has occurred, and a new econ-
omy of meaning regarding the possibility of free speech is in the making. 
Rather than radically pessimistic or romantic assessments, this shift calls for a 
thorough investigation of the manner in which new meanings and norms are 
formed, as well as caution and modesty as to how established paradigms of 
democratic transition theory are used. 
